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PART I: INTRODUCTION
After a year of attempting to conceive a child naturally, Tara and Jacob decide to
consult a fertility specialist who suggests that they undergo in vitro fertilization (IVF).
Tara has oocyte retrieval. Her eggs are subsequently combined with Jacob's sperm in the
laboratory, and six embryos are created as a result. Three embryos are transferred into
Tara's uterus, and the remaining embryos are cryopreserved for future use. Tara
successfully conceives a child, and nine months later the couple becomes parents to a
healthy baby girl. Unfortunately, Tara and Jacob's marriage begins to deteriorate and the
couple files for a divorce. Notwithstanding the end of their union, Tara is eager to have
another child and would like to initiate a pregnancy through the use of the remaining
embryos. Jacob, on the other hand, would like to have the embryos destroyed. Which of
them should prevail?
Although Tara and Jacob are a hypothetical example, their problem is becoming
increasingly real for couples that tum to Assisted Reproductive Technology ("ART"). In
the United States, approximately 500,000 embryos are stored in a cryogenic state without
a definitive plan for their disposition. 1 When the intended parents no longer agree on the
fate of their embryos, they ask the court to resolve this controversial issue for them.
Although courts employ a number of approaches to decide embryo disposition disputes,
none of them lead to satisfactory outcomes. The three adversarial approaches are: 1)
constitutional model, 2) contractual model, and 3) mutual consent model.
1 Molly O'Brien, An Intersection ofEthics and Law: The Frozen Embryo Dilemma and
the Chilling Choice Between Life and Death, 32 WHITTIER L. REv. 171 (2010).

The problematic nature of adversarial model stems from its over-simplified
presumptions of progenitors' interests and intentions. Under the current system,
progenitors surrender their beliefs, intentions, and unique circumstances from being
considered in the resolution process. 2 Courts frequently overlook the highly sensitive
nature of disputes that involve a pot~ntial birth of a child and instead choose to
relentlessly employ a rigid analytical framework. Instead of setting bright line rules,
courts should attempt to create more a flexible standard that considers the unique
circumstances of each dispute. Flexibility of the alternative dispute resolution model
allows parties to deliberate on the issues that are outside the scope of the current legal
frameworks and come forward with creative solutions that are not available under the
adversarial model.
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PART II: THE RELEVANT ISSUES AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER
WHICH DISPUTES ARISE
As advances in reproductive technologies become more prominent, couples that
are unable to naturally conceive a child increasingly tum to ART. 4 One of the most
widely utilized methods of ART is in vitro fertilization ("IVF"). 5 During IVF, a female's
egg cells are fertilized by a male's sperm in a laboratory setting and allowed to divide
into eight-cell embryos. 6 The resulting embryos are either implanted in the uterus of the

2
3

Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 563, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (1998).
Edward Brunet & Charles B. Craver, Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Advocate's
Perspective 4 (1997).
4
Wendy Wendland, Adopting Frozen Embryos; More Hope for Infertile Couples, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 15, 2001, at 3.
s John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status ofEarly Embryos, 76 VA. L.
REv. 437,441 (1990).
6 !d.
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female or cryogenically preserved for possible future use. 7 Today's advanced
preservation techniques allow embryos to remain viable for years after they have been
created. 8
At times, the cryopreserved embryos outlast the relationship of their intended
parents. Although the certain aspects of each dispute significantly differ, the essential
plot line remains the same. After more than a year of unsuccessful attempts to conceive a
child, the couple seeks IVF treatment. A number of embryos are successfully created,
some of which are cryogenically preserved for potential future use. The relationship
between the intended parents begins to deteriorate and they file for a divorce. During the
divorce proceeding, one party seeks to have the embryos brought to term. The other
party seeks to have the embryos destroyed, donated to another couple, or left in the
preserved state. Since the parties are unable to agree on disposition of the embryos, they
turn to the judicial system for resolutions.

A. Fundamental Determinations
To successful ascertain an analytical framework that will guide the embryo
disposition proceeding, the court must make two fundamental determinations. First, the
court must assign a legal status to the embryo.9 Second, the court must determine which
of the progenitors interests will be legally recognized. 10 Once the embryo status is

7 Id

8 See Embryo Cryopreservation Reaches 20 Year Milestone, http://
http://www.infertilitydoctor.com/2004/03/02/embryo-cryopreservation-reaches-20-yearmilestone/ (last visited Nov. 01, 2011).
9 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594-97 (Tenn. 1992) on reh'g in part~ 34, 1992 WL
341632 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992).
10 Ruth Calker, Pregnant Men Revisited or Sperm Is Cheap, Eggs Are Not, 47 HASTINGS
L.J. 1063, 1066-69 (1996).

3

assigned and the legally recognized interests are determined, the court can decide which
of the three adversarial methods would resolve the dispute in the best manner.

I. Determination of Embryo Status
Presently, courts have characterized embryos as either: 1) property, 11 2) property
deserving of special respect, 12 or 3) human life. 13
If the court chooses to characterize embryo as "property," the dispute will be
resolved under contract and property law principles. 14 Consequently, considerations that
become material to the resolution of the embryo dispute are interpretation and
enforceability of the contract as well as application of marital property law. 15 In York v.

Jones, the court classified embryos as "property," and held the fertility clinic was liable
for unlawful conversion of property when the clinic refused to release the embryos to the
progenitors. 16 However, courts are generally reluctant to characterize embryos as plain
"property." 17 Such classification essentially eradicates parties' interest in embryos for its
potential to develop into live beings. 18
Contrary to Jones, the Louisiana Legislature statutorily classified embryo as
"person." 19 The statute directs courts to resolve embryo disputes in accordance with
"best interest of the in vitro fertilized ovum. " 20 Since the standard closely resembles that

11

York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 424-27 (E.D. Va. 1989).
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
13 La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 9:121 (2011).
14 John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition ofFrozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 407,409-10 (1990).
15 Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179-81 (1998).
16 York, 717 F. Supp. at 426-27.
17 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596-97; See also Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 178-79.
18 !d.
19 § 9:123.
20 § 9:131.
12
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of "best interest of the child,), it is hard to presume that courts would rule in any way
other than in favor of progenitor seeking in1plantation.21 Otherwise, courts would be
forced to "weigh the value of being versus nonbeing,)) which is a controversial issues that
is frequently viewed as being inappropriate for courts?2 Furthermore, classifying embryo
as "person)) invokes constitutionally protected rights that are powerful enough to
potentially outlaw IVF programs?3 For the forgoing reasons, Louisiana is the only
jurisdiction that characterizes embryos as "persons."
The most broadly adopted embryo status is "property deserving special respect.)) 24
The court in Davis v. Davis was the first to adopt the "special respect'' classification. 25
The court recognized that embryo's ability to develop into a live being through
implantation and gestation makes it more than plain property. 26 Under "special respect')
classification, progenitors have "an interest in the nature of ownership, to the extent that
they have decision-making authority concerning disposition of the preembryos, within
the scope of policy set by law."27 The "special respect') designation allows progenitors to
contract regarding disposition of embryos. 28 Moreover, this designation elicits
progenitors' constitutional interests in procreation.29 The status of"special respect" does
not confine courts to strict bounds of property or family law, and leaves some ambiguity

Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on
Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1747, 1755-56 (1993).
22 Hester v. Dwivedi, 733 N.E.2d 1161, 1164 (Ohio 2000) (quoting Bowman v. Davis,
356 N.E.2d 496, 499 nJ (Ohio 1976)).
23 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595.
24
!d. at 597.
25 !d.
26 !d. at 596-97.
27 !d.
28 !d. at 597-98.
29 !d.
21
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in the analytical framework.

30

However, courts that adopted "special respect" status

typically treat embryos more as property rather than person. This is evident by courts'
willingness to allow destruction or donation of embryos to research, and freedom to
contract on their disposition. 31

2. The Legally Recognized Interests and The Role of Progenitors
An equally important issue in resolution of embryo disputes is the determination
of legally recognized interests of progenitors. Since both progenitors contribute their
genetic material to the creation of embryo, they both have a substantial interest in the
outcome of the dispute. 32 Although courts unanimously agree that progenitors have
interests in disposition of embryos, courts are unable to come to a consensus on the
nature of those interests. 33 In fact, procreation and parenthood are the only interests that
courts have universally recognized. 34 Consequently, numerous significant interests such
as belief in preservation of human life35 , disproportionately greater involvement of
women in creation of embryos36 , as well possibility of viewing the issue from the best
interest of the child37 have been ignored.
Courts also disregard circumstances surrounding the parties' relationship prior to
disassociation. Typically, when intended parents enter IVF treatment they are involved

!d. at 594-97.
31 !d. at 597.
32Jd.
33 Colker, supra note 10, at 1066-69.
34 See Id
30

35

J.B. v. M.B., 170 N.J. 9, 15, 783 A.2d 707, 711 (2001).
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992).
37 In reMarriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 774 (Iowa 2003).

36
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in a committed relationship with hopes of becoming parents in the near future. 38 Ideally,
a couple would undergo IVF treatment because both progenitors seek to achieve
parenthood. However, there are instances when coercion and desperate attempts to avoid
conflicts could force a progenitor to agree to IVF. This is precisely the reason some
scholars have argued that agreements between couples prior to their separation should be
viewed as highly suspect. 39 Nevertheless, courts do not conduct a fact intensive analysis
that would allow them to uncover such instances.
Another important consideration that is frequently disregarded by courts is
reliance. 40 Some progenitors choose to undergo IVF because of medical conditions that
render them unable to have biological children in the future. 41 Whether those progenitors
should be granted a special consideration is a contested issue, which only a few courts
have addressed. 42 The court in Davis held that progenitor who is unable to have a child
through any means other than implantation would be awarded the embryos
notwithstanding the other party's opposition. 43 However, if adoption is a viable option,
progenitor will be deprived of the only chance to have a genetically related child.
Another consideration that is overlooked by courts, but is frequently discussed by
the academics, is the disproportionate burden and physical commitment that females have
to endure during IVF process. 44 Typically, an intended mother undergoes months of

Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable
Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REv. 55, 97-104 (1999).
39 !d. at 102-04.
40 !d. at 102.
41 Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 175 (1998).
42 Robertson, supra note 14, at 414-16.
4 3 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603-05 (Tenn. 1992).
44 John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L.
REv. 437, 441-46 (1990).
38
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hormonal therapy, painful egg extractions, and a harvesting process. 45 The unequivocally
greater burden on the woman has led to a proposed presumption in favor of the fen1ale
progenitor's preference. 46 Despite the fact that courts have not adopted this presumption,
women's often painful and life-altering involvements in IVF should not be left without
proper respect and recognition.

PART III: CURRENT JUDICIAL RESOLUTION APPROACHES
Currently, there are three judicial approaches that have been employed by courts
in embryo disposition disputes. Fist, constitutional approach centers on balancing each
progenitor's interests in procreation. Second, contractual approach primarily focuses on
prior directives signed by the intended parents. Last, contemporaneous mutual consent
approach seeks to preserve status quo until parties can reach a consensus.

A. Constitutional Model: Balancing Interests in Procreation

The constitutional model focuses on balancing each progenitor's constitutionally
protected interest in procreation. The court in Davis v. Davis was the first to implement
the balancing test as the controlling analytical framework in resolution of the dispute. 47
The court in Davis held that generally disputes between intended parents should be
decided according to prior directives created by the parties. 48 However, since the Davises
did not enter into an express agreement regarding disposition of the embryos, the dispute
was resolved by examining their constitutional rights to privacy. 49

Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601-02.
Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status ofthe Embryo, 32 LoY. L. REv. 357,403 (1986).
47 Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588.
48 !d. at 597.
4 9 !d. at 598-603.

45

46
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The court held that "a vital part of individual's right to privacy" is the right to
procreate and the right to avoid procreation, each being of equal significance. 50 In the
process of balancing these conflicting rights, the court analyzed the "positions of the ,
[progenitors], the significance of their interests, and the relative burdens that [would] be
imposed by differing resolutions."

51

However, the dispositive factor transpired from

weighing the burden of "unwanted parenthood" that would be imposed on the intended
father against the intended mother's desire to donate the embryo to another couple. 52
The court held that the burden of unwanted parenthood outweighed the desire to
donate the embryo to another couple. 53 Consequently, the intended father was granted
4

the control over embryos. 5 The court found the intended mother's interests to be less
significant because she did not seek to use the embryos for her own use. 55 Moreover, she
was physically able to undergo another round of IVF if she wished to become a parent in
the future. 56 On the other hand, if embryos were donated to another couple, the father
"would face a lifetime of either wondering about his parental status or knowing about his
parental status but having no control over it." 57
Courts continue to rule in favor of progenitors who seek to discard embryos. 58
Courts justify this generalized outcome by emphasizing the concern of forever foregoing

Id at 600-01.
51 Id at 603.
52 Id at 604.
5o

53Jd
54Jd
55Jd
56 !d.
57 !d.
58

J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d at 707, 719-20 (2001).
9

the right to avoid procreation if implantation leads to childbirth. 59 According to judges,
birth of a biologically related child would lead to "life-long en1otional and psychological
repercussions. "

60

This presumption coupled with judges' limited inquiry into

circumstances surrounding the dispute make judges reluctant to grant embryos to
progenitor seeking implantation.
Although courts refer to the right to procreate and avoid procreation as being
equal, as of today, no court has awarded control over embryos to the progenitor seeking
implantation.

61

Moreover, the only recognized exception to this general outcome arises

when progenitor is unable to achieve parenthood through any other means, potentially
even adoption.

62

Total inability to achieve parenthood appears to be the threshold

requirement that procreation-seeking progenitors have to show to be granted a chance at
succeeding in litigation. 63 However, as of today, this narrow exception has not been
invoked in judicial proceedings.

B.. Contractual Model: Enforcement of Prior Directives
The predominant approach used by courts to resolve embryo disputes is the
contractual model, which focuses on progenitors' initial intent. Seven of the ten appellate
decisions involving embryo disputes implemented the contractual approach. 64 In rare
instances do progenitors create agreements among themselves regarding disposition of

JB., 783 A.2d at 719-20.
60 Id
61 Mark P. Strasser, You Take the Embryos but I Get the House (and the Business):
Recent Trends in Awards Involving Embryos Upon Divorce, 57 BUFF. L. REv. 1159, 1224
(2009); see also Margaret E. Swain, What Art Clients Don't Know Can Hurt Them!, FAM.
Anvoc., Fall2011, at 18, 20.
62
Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic Consent Forms Are
Not the Answer, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 57,62 (2011).
63
See !d.
64 Forman, supra note 62, at 66.
59
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the unused embryos.

65

However, most progenitors are required to complete informed

consent forms provided by clinics prior to undergoing an IVF procedure. 66 Typically,
every informed consent form asks progenitors to specify what they intend to do with the
remaining preserved embryos in case of divorce, death, or other events that will inhibit
them from jointly deciding on the disposition question. 67 Although consent forms are
agreements created between progenitors and IVF clinics rather than parties directly,
courts have been eager to utilize these forms as interpretative guides to parties' initial
intent. 68
Courts have not hesitated to enforce parties' prior directives when those directives
called for destruction or donation of frozen embryos. 69 The leading case on contractual
approach, Kass v. Kass, held that prior directive created by parties are a reliable
manifestation of their intent. 70 Moreover, those directives are "presumed valid and
binding, and [will be] enforced." 71 According to the Kass court, strict adherence to prior
agreements creates predictability that all parties can rely on. 72 Since progenitors are the
ones who made the choice on the consent form, there is no uncertainty left for courts to
decide. 73

Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing over Embryos: Of Contracts and Consents, 32 ARiz. ST.
L.J. 897, 918-33 (2000).
65

66Jd
See Coleman, supra note 38, at 109-17.
68 Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (1998).
69 Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40,52 (Tex. App. 2006); Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180, In re
Marriage of Dahl, 2008 WL 4490304 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); Cahill v. Cahill, 757 So.2d
465,467 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000); Karmasu v. Karmasu, 2009 WL 3155062 (Ohio Ct. App.
2009); Dodson v. Univ. of Ark. forMed. Sci., 601 FJd 750 (8th Cir. 2010).

67

70Jd
11Jd.
12Jd.
73

Id
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Courts acknowledge, yet dismiss, significant deficiencies that are associated with
contractual approach. Judges recognize that sometimes couples may place a checkmark
on a consent forms without considering the implication of that choice. 74 Furthermore,
embryos' prolonged viability gives couples ample opportunities to change their minds
regarding disposition of the embryos. 75 Yet, courts state that predictability overrides
these very important concerns. 76
Litowitz v. Litowitz is an excellent illustration of the dangers associated with

contractual model. 77 The court in Litowitz enforced a prior directive that was contrary to
the requests of both parties. 78 During the litigation proceeding, the intended mother was
asking the court to allow the embryos to be used for implantation in a surrogate, while the
intended father requested the embryos to be donated to another couple. 79
The court chose to resolve the couple's dispute by relying on the cryopreservation
contract signed by the Litowitzs prior to undergoing IVF. 80 According to the
cryopreservation contract, the couple agreed that the embryos would be cryopreserved for
five years. 81 Upon expiration of the five year period, the couple had the option to request
the preservation to be prolonged, otherwise, the embryos would" 'be thawed but not
allowed to undergo further development' " 82 The court held that since the couple did not

74Jd.
75Jd
76Jd
77 48 PJd 261 (Wash. 2002).
78 Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 263.
79 Id
80 /dat 267-68.
81 /dat 268.
82Jd.
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seek an extension and the five years have elapsed, the embryos should be discarded in
accordance with the prior directive. 83
The Litowitz court precluded both parties from exercising their rights to the
embryos. 84 Furthermore, the court contradicted the fundamental conviction of the
contractual approach which is "[t]o the extent possible, it should be the progenitors-not
the State and not the courts-who ... make this deeply personal life choice." 85
C. Contemporaneous Mutual Consent Model
The last approach that courts have employed to resolve embryo disputes is the
contemporaneous mutual consent model. First adopted by the court in In re Marriage of

Witten, mutual consent model focuses on the present, as opposed to initial, intent of
progenitors. 86 The court in Witten explained its decision for adopting the new approach
by highlighting the inherent inadequacies of the contractual model. 87 The court found
that couples that choose to undergo IVF treatment are more likely to make decision based
on impulse and emotions rather than "rational deliberations. " 88 Furthermore, wrongful
predictions regarding how one will feel about his decisions in the future can have "grave
repercussions. " 89 Enforcement of prior directive could force individuals to make lifealtering adjustments to accommodate for the birth of a child and the associated
responsibilities of childrearing. On the other hand, a person could be deprived of the

83

Id at 269-272.

84 Jd.

Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (1998).
672 N.W.2d 768, 777-83 (Iowa 2003).
87 Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 779-83.
88 !d. at 777.
89 !d. at 778.

85

86
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only chance to have a genetically related child, resulting in devastating effects on the
person's physical and emotional wellbeing.
The court in Witten chose to refrain from making such life-altering decisions. The
court concluded that in situations when progenitors no longer agree regarding disposition
of their embryos, the court would preserve status quo until the parties can reach a
"mutually satisfactory" decision. 90 Until parties reach an agreement, the party opposing
destruction will be responsible for the associated fees of keeping the embryos
cryogenically preserved. 91

PART IV: THE INADEQUECIES OF ADERSARIAL APPROACHES
Although the judicial system employs numerous approaches to resolve embryo
disputes, the substantial deficiencies associated with each approach prevent them from
effectively fulfilling their function.

A. The Balancing Test
Application of the balancing test in resolution of embryo disputes appears to be
more of a pretextual practice rather than a legitimate balancing of progenitors'
constitutional rights. Courts that adopted the balancing test have acknowledged that the
right to avoid procreation will generally prevail, unless no other reasonable means to
achieve parenthood exist.92 However, as previously mentioned, no court has every
invoked the exception and awarded custody over embryos to the party seeking

9 0 !d.

at 783.

91Jd

See Davis v. Davis, 842 S. W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992); see also J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d
at 707, 720 (2001).

92
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implantation.

93

Therefore, the exception can be accurately classified as a "bright line

escape hatch,)' rather than an applicable standard. 94
An "escape hatch" is a tool that judges can use to formulate bright-line rules. 95
Essentially, "[t]he escape hatch permits the [c]ourt to create predictable, clear-cut rules
that cover virtually all relevant situations without completely sacrificing flexibility or
permitting those protected by the rule to flagrantly abuse their trust. " 96 In the context of
embryo disputes, courts created a bright line rule against forced procreation with an
"extremely narrow and possibly futile exception." 97
Feminist legal scholars have argued that resolution of embryo disputes through
application of the balancing test inhibits a woman's ability to exercise her interests in
procreation.98 Since the party seeking implantation is generally a female, the law, in
effect, discriminates against females by always granting embryos to the party seeking to
avoid procreation. 99 Moreover, female's contribution to IVF process is incomparably

Jennifer L. Medenwald, A "Frozen Exception" for the Frozen Embryo: The Davis
"Reasonable Alternatives Exception," 76 IND. L.J. 507, 519 (2001).
94 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term--Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 25, 87 (1992).
95 James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms ofDoctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test
Continuum, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 773, 788 (1995).
96 !d. at 790.
97 Kimberly Berg, Special Respect: For Embryos and Progenitors, 74 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 506, 518 (2006).
98 See, e.g., In reMarriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Iowa 2003).; A.Z. v. B.Z.,
725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057-58 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d at 707, 716 (2001); Kass
v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 181 (1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603 (Tenn. 1992).
99 Judith F. Daar, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pregnancy Process:
Developing an Equality Model to Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25 AM. J.L. & MED.
455, 466 (1999).
93
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greater than male's. Yet, women's rights are essentially eviscerated under the
presumptive rule of procreation avoidance. 100

B. The Contractual Model
The contractual model has been criticized as a significantly problematic approach.
First of all, courts have acknowledged that couples never perceive clinical informed
consent forms as binding between them. 101 Rather the intended parents perceive the
forms as a contract between them and the IVF clinic. 102 Consequently, an informed
consent form "does not represent the progenitors' intent to direct a disposition for the
embryos [dispute] when they no longer agree about their pursuit ofiVF treatment." 103
Furthermore, the rigid construct of the contractual model does not account for
changes in circumstances that couples cannot predict when they begin IVF process. 104
For instance, the intended mother may suffer a medical condition that renders her unable
to have genetically related children without the use of the preserved embryos. 105
Moreover, one of the progenitors may experience serious financial difficulties post
divorce, yet be forced to become a parent and financially support the child. 106 Inability to
predict the future and the changing circumstances is an important factor that is
disregarded by judges under the contractual approach.

1oo Andrews, supra note 46, 358-59.
10 1 Angela K. Upchurch, A Postmodern Deconstruction of Frozen Embryo Disputes, 39
CoNN. L. REv. 2107, 2125 (2007).
102 !d.
103 !d.
10 4 See In reMarriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 781 (Iowa 2003).
105 See Coleman, supra note 38, at 97-104.
106 ld.
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Some statistical data suggests that couples that undergo IVF treatment are
prevalent to altering their initial embryo disposition decision. 107 An IVF clinic at
Northwestern University conducted a study that observed 41 post-IVF couples and their
decisions regarding cryopreserved embryos. 108 Upon expiration of the three-year storage
deadline, "only 12 of these couples (29 percent) kept their initial disposition choice; 29
couples (71 percent) changed their preferences." 109 Despite the small sample size, the
study reveals important patterns in intended parent's behavior that courts should not
1gnore.
Contractual approach has also been criticized for enforcing ambiguous consent
forms and disregarding public policy concerns. 110 In A.Z v. B.Z., the court rejected
enforcement of a prior directive, finding that the directive did not represent clear
intentions of the parties regarding disposition of the embryos in the event of a future
dispute. 111 The court also expanded its analysis to prior directives in instances when no
issue of ambiguity was present. 112 The court held that agreements, which expressly grant
control of the embryos to the progenitor seeking implantation, should never be enforced
over the objection of the other party. 113 Such agreements would result in one progenitor
becoming a parent against his will. 114 The court held that "forced procreation is not an

10 7

Susan C. Klock et al., The Disposition of Unused Frozen Embryos, 345 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 69 (2001).
10 8 !d. at 69.
109 ld
11o A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1056-57 (Mass. 2000).
111 A.Z, 725 N.E.2d at 1056-58.
11 2 Id at 1057-58.
113 /d. at 1056-58.
114 /d. at 1057.
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area amendable to judicial enforcement" and would violate public policy. 115 The court
equated embryo disposition contracts to other familiar contracts such as promise to marry
and give up a child for adoption prior to birth, which are in violate public policy and are
not enforceable. 116

C. Contemporaneous Mutual Assent
Although at the outset the contemporaneous mutual assent model appears to be
neutral towards both parties in a dispute, in actuality, it favors the party seeking
procreation avoidance. By imposing storage fees on the party opposing destruction of
embryos, the court essentially suggests that the person wishing to avoid procreation "has
an unparalleled interest in preserving this right." 117 If courts considered the right to
procreate to be of equal importance, then both parties would be compelled to carry the
financial burden of continued storage. 118 By forcing the party who opposes destruction to
pay continuous storage fees, "the court not only ignores this party's procreative rights but
effectively punishes that party for pursuing those rights." 119
Furthermore, "rather than giving control to the individual, the status quo strips
control from the individuals by giving equal power to both progenitors who are free to
oppose one another." 120 Status quo approach provides no incentive for the party seeking
embryo destruction to come to a consensus with his former spouse. 121 Consequently, the

115 !d.

at 1058.

ld
117 Berg, supra note 97, at 520.
118 Id
119 Jessica L. Lambert, Developing A Legal Framework for Resolving Disputes Between
''Adoptive Parents" ofFrozen Embryos: A Comparison to Resolutions ofDivorce
Disputes Between Progenitors, 49 B.C. L. REv. 529, 563 (2008).
12o Upchurch, supra note 101, at 2137.
121 See In reMarriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Iowa 2003).
116
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party seeking destruction can have their wishes indirectly fulfilled by holding the
embryos indefinitely preserved or at least until they are no longer viable for implantation.

D. The Main Issue Associated With All Adversarial Approaches
Regardless of the approach courts choose to adopt, the outcome is remarkably the
same: avoidance ofprocreation. 122 If the judicial analysis is based on balancing the
constitutional right to procreate and avoid procreation, the right to avoid procreation is
seen as supreme and consequently prevails. 123 If a prior directive with "conflicting" and
"ambiguous" terms exists, courts nevertheless find that the contract represents a "clear"
manifestation of the parties' intent to either donate or destroy the embryo. 124
Furthermore, when contracts explicitly call for awarding the embryos to the party seeking
procreation, courts find such contracts contrary to public policy and therefore
unenforceable. 125 Evidently, if one of the gamete donors opposes implantation, it is
virtually impossible for the other donor to prevail in the dispute.
Remarkably, the prejudicial favoritism toward procreation avoidance has no legal
justification. There is no constitutional basis for granting the right to avoid procreation
greater significance. 126 Furthermore, contract law generally does not release from
liability parties that are contractually bound to commitments in adoption, surrogacy, or
egg and sperm donation, despite ambiguities or public policy concerns that may

122 Ellen Waldman & Marybeth Herald, Eyes Wide Shut: Erasing Women's Experiences
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accompany those agreements.

127

Instead, the preferentialism toward procreation

avoidance rests upon preconceived notions of the role that biological ties play in parental
attachment to a child. 128
Contrary to courts' preconceived notions, a large body of social science data
suggests that biology is not a determinant factor in formation of attachment to a child. 129
Instead, parental attachment is viewed as a "social construct," which is very contextspecific and depends upon various societal influences. 130 Researchers have identified at
least five predictive factors of parental "disengagement." 131 First, a considerable
geographic distance that prevents physical visitations may sever the relationship between
a parent and a child. 132 Second, quality of one's relationship with the other spouse is a
strong indicator of parental involvement. 133 A diminished father-child bond usually
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results when a romantic relationship between the father and the mother ends. 134
Moreover, the parent-child relationship usually suffers if the father proceeds to have a
family with a new partner. 135 Next, a father's financial inability to provide for the child
usually leads to his emotional detachment from the child. 136 Lastly, community, peers,
and family relations influence the strength of the bond that develops between a parent and
a child. 137 In communities where pregnancy and childrearing frequently occur without
paternal involvement, genetic connections are viewed as weak indicators of whether a
man will assume a fatherly role in the child's life. 138 Similarly, young adults who do not
share strong bonds with their fathers usually develop detachment from their own
children. 139
Evidently, presence of biological ties alone does not lead to lifelong psychological
ties. Therefore, courts' relentless imposition of procreation avoidance is meritless.
Instead of asking "What does the data on psychological parenthood actually show?"
judges ask, "Can I think of any illustrations where such psychological harm might

°

result?" 14 Certainly there will be instances where biological ties coupled with
predisposition of social factors will lead to strong emotional ties.
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However, typical
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circumstances stuTounding embryos disputes point to the opposite conclusion. 142 It is
unjust for courts to create unsubstantiated presumptions of psychological attachments that
deprive progenitors from a tangible opportunity to exercise their procreational rights.

PART IV: Alternative Dispute Resolution: Mending the Adversarial Deficiencies
To avoid issues commonly associated with adversarial process, embryo disputes
should be decided under an alternative dispute resolution called arbitration. Unlike
adversarial judicial process, arbitration allows for greater flexibility without constraints
of overly simplistic tests. 143 Moreover, arbitration is not limited to principles of contracts
or legally recognized interests of progenitors. 144 The alternative dispute resolution model
allows progenitors to tailor the resolution analysis according to their true individual
interests. 145

Arbitration is the most suitable form of alternative dispute resolution in instances
when parties do not believe they can jointly reach an amicable solution. 146 An arbitrator
is a neutral third party chosen by progenitors to render a binding decision in their
dispute. 147 Parties are free to choose someone with expertise in family law, whom they
both "respect and feel comfortable making decisions that will greatly affect their
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lives."

148

Since arbitration proceeding is not bound by substantive law or legal precedent)

it allows for "greater self-determination of the process by the participants." 149 Due to the
greater self-determination, the parties are generally more accepting of the final decision
and are less likely to experience resentment or hostility toward each other. 150

Arbitration's reduced emphasis on formality of the process allows parties to settle
disputes in a time and cost efficient manner. 151 Extensive backlogs associated with
majority of court systems substantiality prolong the duration of embryo disputes. 152 On
the other hand, arbitration allows parties to choose the date and time when the arbitration
will take place. 153 The efficiency of the process reduces the associated costs) thereby,
making arbitration a financially accessible option for couples that cannot afford
litigation. 154 Most importantly, arbitration is less antagonistic and reduces the stress and
trauma that is frequently associated with litigation proceedings. 155

The analytical framework of the adversarial process is largely determined by the
status that the court assigns to the embryo. The status dictates the legal rights and
relevant issues that the court will consider in resolving the embryo dispute. While most
courts adopt property deserving special respect status, the special respect classification
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has greater resemblance to plain property than human life. 156 However, many people
would be reluctant to view embryos as plain property. 157 "Precisely because the early
embryo is genetically unique and has the potential to be more, it operates as a powerful
symbol ... of the unique gift of human existence." 158 By virtue of being a powerful
symbol of human existence, 159 embryos should not be simply placed under the umbrella
of contract law.

Embryo disputes revolve around highly personalized and diverse beliefs about
origin of human life. The controversial nature of this issue makes it is improper for
courts to uniformly impose "special respect" status upon every couple that enters the
courtroom. Some couples strongly believe that embryo is human life and should never be
destroyed. 160 Unfortunately, under the adversarial model, courts cannot consider
individual beliefs of intended parents. 161 Instead, courts assign a particular status to the
embryos and based on the assigned status, determine the nature of the associated
progenitor rights. 162 Legal precedent is created. Thereafter, that legal precedent will be
binding upon every couple that enters the courtroom, irrespective of their individual
beliefs. 163
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To avoid imposition of highly ethical conclusions on individuals, every couple
should be entitled to assign a status to their embryos. 164 Progenitors should be
empowered to introduce their personal notions into the resolution process, since they are
the ones who could ultimately attain parental responsibilities. 165 Taking embryo disputes
outside the courtroom would avoid creation of legal precedent and allow for greater
flexibility in the resolution process. 166

Under the adversarial model, courts limit the scope of analysis to the constitutionally
protected interests in privacy and specifically procreation. 167 However, focusing strictly
on procreational rights substantially oversimplifies the nature of embryo disputes and
diminishes parties' expectations of receiving a cognizant and fair resolution. Interests
such as: progenitor's belief in embryo being human life, a woman's substantially greater
physical and emotional burdens of undergoing IVF, emotional attachment to embryo, and
best interests of embryo are precluded from consideration. 168
Furthermore, the adversarial model ignores the "emotionally charged" nature of IVF
process and the possibility of coercion or reliance being the major provoking factors in
enduring IVF. 169 It seems innately unfair to deprive a female of her only chance to
become a mother, when she desperately relied on her former spouse's consent for
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implantation prior to undergoing hysterectomy. 170 It would seem equally unfair to have a
man, who was coerced into IVF by his ex-wife but finally gathered the courage to walk
away from a dysfunctional relationship, to be forced into parenthood. 171 The adversarial
model's inability to adequately account for situations, such as the ones mentioned above,
is one of the reasons why the alternative dispute resolution model should be adopted. 172
Under the alternate dispute resolution model, parties would be free to choose
which interests are significant to the resolution of their particular dispute. 173 Progenitors
would no longer be limited by the legally recognized interest in procreation and personal
autonomy. 174 In arbitration, intended parents could introduce into the analysis their
religious beliefs, which may not condone destruction of embryos. 175 Moreover, couples
would finally have the ultimate decision-making authority that courts frequently
emphasize but fail to provide. Releasing progenitors from the constraints of the
adversarial process would truly empower them as the ultimate decision-makers. 176

V. CONCLUSION
The highly personalized nature of embryo disputes makes it extremely difficult
for courts to arrive at satisfactory judicial resolutions. Rarely if ever do courts attempt to
understand the specific circumstances of each couple's dispute. Instead, courts resort to
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overly simplified tests that narrow the scope of disputes. Courts either limit the analysis
to constitutional interests in procreation or relentlessly enforce prior directives without
regard to progenitors' present intentions. Although, courts frequently proclaim their
desires to vest the ultimate power in progenitors, in actuality, disputes are resolved based
on judges' preconceived notions. Instead of providing progenitors with ample
opportunity to determine the most suitable outcome, courts incessantly favor progenitors
who desire to avoid procreation.
The unequal treatment of progenitors partially stems from court's characterization
of embryos as "property deserving special respect." Although courts have chosen a status
that appears to accurately portray societal notions of embryos, in practice, "special
respect" classification proved to be nothing other than plain property. Such an insensate
treatment of embryos is very problematic, considering the controversy surrounding
beliefs in origin of life.
The inadequacies that are associated with the adversarial model can be effectively
corrected by the alternative dispute resolution. Releasing embryo disputes from the
adversarial constraints will furnish intended parents with power to influence the
resolution process and the final decision. Progenitors will decide which issues and
interests are relevant to resolution of their particular disputes. Moreover, intended
parents will have complete discretion over classification of their embryos. By granting
progenitors authority over disposition of their embryos, courts will not only avoid
intrusions into sensitive and private matters but also allow couples to reach decisions that
are tailored to their unique circumstances rather than legislative precedent.
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